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Abstract 
Three experiments investigated the relationship between future thinking and false 
memories. In Experiment 1, participants remembered familiar events (e.g., a holiday) 
from their past, imagined planning the same events in the future, or took part in a 
control condition in which they visualized typical events. They then rated a series of 
schema-related and schema-unrelated nouns for how likely they were to be 
encountered within those events. In a surprise recognition test, participants in the 
future condition falsely recognized more schema-related items than participants in the 
past and control conditions. No reliable effects of rating condition were observed in 
correct recognition. Experiment 2 found the same pattern when participants imagined 
unfamiliar events (e.g., taking part in a bank robbery) from past or future 
perspectives. Participants in Experiment 3 remembered a past or imagined a future 
holiday and were then instructed to generate items that someone might take on a 
holiday. Participants in the future condition generated more nonstudied items and 
fewer studied items relative to participants in the past condition. The findings of 
Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that simulating future events enhances the activation of 
related items that gives rise to false memories. The findings of Experiment 3 suggest 
that these activation processes play an adaptive role in guiding the planning of future 
events.  
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Simulation, False Memories, and the Planning of Future Events 
There is an emerging view that one of the key functions of human memory is 
to help us anticipate and plan for the future (for recent discussions see Klein, 2013, 
and Szpunar, Spreng, & Schacter, 2014). According to Tulving (1993), the episodic 
memory system allows individuals to engage in “mental time travel” whereby they 
can simulate future events as well as remember past events (see also Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 1997). The concept of mental time travel subsequently formed the basis of 
the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (e.g., Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 
2007, 2008; Schacter & Addis, 2007a, 2007b), which proposes that the neural systems 
and cognitive processes that support the retrieval of episodic memories also support 
episodic simulation of possible futures. There is evidence that other forms of memory, 
such as semantic memory, can also support the simulation of future scenarios 
(Anderson, 2012; Cordonnier, Barnier, & Sutton, 2016). According to the semantic 
scaffolding hypothesis (Irish & Piguet, 2013) semantic knowledge provides a 
framework that guides the construction of future events. Recently, Szpunar et al. 
proposed a broader taxonomy of future thinking that incorporates simulation 
alongside other types of future-oriented, or prospective, cognition such as planning. 
This taxonomy further emphasises the underlying role of both episodic and semantic 
memory across all aspects of prospective cognition. Considered together, the 
convergent literature illustrates the view that human memory is oriented towards the 
future. 
The notion of a future-oriented function of memory is supported by findings 
that simulating future events acts as a powerful mnemonic device. This was first 
demonstrated by Klein, Robertson, and Delton (2010) in a study in which participants 
were instructed to recall a past camping trip or imagine planning a future camping 
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trip. The participants were then presented with a series of object nouns, either related 
or unrelated to camping. Participants in the past condition were asked to rate how 
likely it was that each of the objects was at the camping trip that they remembered, 
while participants in the future condition were asked to rate how likely it was that 
they would take each of the objects as they planned the camping trip. Participants in 
an atemporal control condition were asked to form an image of a campsite and rate 
the likelihood of each object being at the campsite. In a surprise recall test, 
participants who rated the nouns in relation to a future camping trip recalled more of 
the nouns than those who rated them in relation to a past camping trip. Future rating 
also led to better recall of the nouns than rating their relevance to a typical camping 
trip (without reference to past or future events) or to a survival scenario (see Nairne, 
Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007). In a follow-up study, Klein, Robertson, and Delton 
(2011) provided evidence that planning is the key factor in producing the survival 
processing effect (see Nairne et al., 2007).  
Continuing this line of research, Klein, Robertson, Delton, and Lax (2012) 
investigated the role of personal experience in producing the mnemonic effect of 
planning. They compared four encoding conditions; two that were likely to invoke 
personal experiences (planning a dinner party and planning a picnic) and two that 
were less likely to invoke personal experiences (planning to feed animals at a local 
zoo and planning a trip to Antarctica). Participants in each condition rated the same 
set of nouns (food items) for the likelihood that they would be considered when 
planning the activity. Klein et al found that the two rating conditions that invoked 
personal experiences led to higher levels of recall of the rated items than the two 
conditions that did not invoke personal experiences. They interpreted their findings in 
terms of the distinction made by Klein, Loftus, and Kihlstrom (2002) between lived 
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time, based on episodic memories, and known time, based on semantic memory. 
Although future planning tasks based on lived and known time both enhanced the 
recall of words rated in relation to those tasks, the effect was greater for planning 
tasks that invoke lived time.  
In a recent study, we (Dewhurst, Anderson, Grace, & van Esch, 2016) 
investigated the effects of past and future thinking on false memory. In a series of 
experiments, participants were instructed to recall a past holiday or imagine planning 
a future holiday. They then took part in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) 
procedure (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) in which they were presented 
with lists of words (e.g., bed, dream, wake, etc.) that were associates of a 
nonpresented critical lure (e.g., sleep). The DRM procedure produces a powerful 
illusion of memory whereby participants show high levels of false recall and false 
recognition of the critical lures (see Gallo, 2010, for a review). We found that levels 
of false memories increased when DRM lists were rated for their relevance to a future 
holiday, relative to conditions in which the words were rated for their relevance to a 
past holiday or rated for pleasantness. This effect occurred in both recall and 
recognition memory, and with both between- and within-subjects manipulations of 
rating tasks.  
The findings of Dewhurst et al. (2016) were interpreted in relation to the view 
that imagining the future leads to more flexible thinking than remembering the past 
(see D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier, & van der Linden, 2010). We speculated that 
the greater flexibility of future thinking enabled participants to think creatively about 
the items they may encounter in a future event. This greater flexibility enhanced the 
associative processes that give rise to false memories in the DRM paradigm, thereby 
increasing the likelihood that critical lures were activated at study and, subsequently, 
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falsely remembered at test. This interpretation is consistent with findings recently 
reported by Campbell, Benoit, and Schacter (2017), who investigated the effects of 
inhibition on imagining the future. As Campbell et al. observed, tasks such as 
retrieval-induced forgetting show that successful retrieval often requires the inhibition 
of related concepts (see Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). In contrast to the effects 
typically observed in retrieval, Campbell et al. found that related concepts were 
automatically primed, rather than inhibited, when imagining future events.  
Although Dewhurst et al. (2016) reported reliable effects of future thinking on 
false memories in three experiments, our findings raised a number of issues that 
warrant further investigation. First, it is important to determine whether the effect of 
future thinking on false memory extends beyond DRM lists, which were designed to 
produce high levels of false memories. In the studies reported below, participants 
studied schema-related words of the type used by Klein et al. (2010) rather than DRM 
lists. Schema-driven false memories have been well documented. In a classic study by 
Brewer and Treyens (1981), participants falsely remembered objects consistent with 
an office schema (e.g., filing cabinet) after waiting in a graduate student’s office, from 
which those items had been removed. Schema-driven false memories have also been 
created using pictures (Miller & Gazzaniga, 1998) and stories (e.g., Dewhurst, 
Holmes, Swannell, & Barry, 2008; Lampinen, Faries, Neuschatz, & Toglia, 2000). 
Although the types of knowledge that underlie schema-based false memories differ 
from those that give rise to the DRM illusion, both schema-based and associative 
memory illusions are driven by the activation of stored knowledge (see Roediger, 
Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). One of the aims of the current study is to 
determine whether future thinking increases schema-driven false memories, which 
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have been credited with having greater ecological validity than the DRM illusion 
(Miller & Gazzaniga).  
A second issue addressed in the current study is that Dewhurst et al. (2016) 
found no effects of rating condition (past vs. future vs. control) on correct recall or 
recognition. These null effects contrast with the findings of Klein et al. (2010) that 
rating words for their relevance to a future event, compared to a past event, enhanced 
correct recall of the words. We discuss possible reasons for this discrepancy below. 
Finally, the finding that future simulation increased false memories raises important 
questions about the potential adaptive nature of false memories (see Fernandez, 2015, 
Howe, 2011, Schacter, 2012, and Schacter, Guerin, & St Jacques, 2011, for recent 
discussions of the view that false memories can be adaptive). Specifically, are there 
positive consequences associated with the increase in false memories as a result of 
future simulation? 
The current experiments were designed to address these and other questions. 
The primary aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether the effects of future 
thinking on false memory can also be found with schema-related words of the type 
used by Klein et al. (2010). Experiment 2 investigated whether the effects of future 
thinking on false memory reflect the hypothetical nature of future events rather than 
their temporal direction. Comparison between past and future events is essentially a 
comparison between real events that happened in a particular way and hypothetical 
events that may unfold in numerous ways (see Schacter, Addis, Hassabis, Martin, 
Spreng, & Szpunar, 2012). Experiment 2 was designed to address this confound by 
instructing participants to simulate hypothetical events from either a past or future 
perspective. The aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate the positive consequences of 
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future thinking by replacing the memory test with a task in which participants were 
instructed to generate items associated with the activity presented in the study phase.  
As noted above, Dewhurst et al. (2016) reported no significant effects of 
rating condition on correct recall or recognition. We speculated that the associative 
nature of the DRM lists overshadowed the effects of rating condition in correct 
memory. It is possible, however, that the nonsignificant effects were simply due to 
insufficient power. In the first experiment reported by Dewhurst et al., the null effect 
of rating condition in correct recall was based on a sample size of 48 per condition. 
However, power analysis using G Power 3 software (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & 
Buchner, 2007) showed that a minimum sample size of 85 per condition would be 
required to achieve adequate power (1 – 0.8) to replicate the small to medium effect 
size (d = .43) observed by Klein et al. (2010). Some support for the validity of the 
nonsignificant result reported by Dewhurst et al. was provided by Experiment 2, 
which showed a nonsignificant effect of rating condition in correct recognition using 
a more powerful within-subjects design. Nevertheless, the failure to replicate the 
effects observed by Klein et al. in correct memory warrants further investigation.  
One way to determine whether nonsignificant results are genuine null effects 
or simply the result of insensitive data is to conduct a Bayesian analysis. Bayesian 
analyses produce a Bayes factor, B, which allows one to judge whether the data 
support the experimental hypothesis or the null hypothesis (see Dienes, 2014, for a 
review). According to Jeffreys (1939; see also Dienes, 2016), B > 3 provides powerful 
support for the experimental hypothesis, whereas B < 1/3 provides powerful support 
for the null hypothesis (rather than simply a failure to reject it). A Bayesian analysis 
of the correct recall reported by Dewhurst et al. for past versus future rating, using the 
means reported by Klein et al. (2010) for the expected effect size, produced a value of 
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B = 0.29. This provides strong support for the null hypothesis that rating condition has 
no reliable effect on correct memory, at least when the stimuli consist of DRM lists. 
The primary aim of the current experiments, however, was to investigate 
whether the effects of future thinking on false memory extend to schema-related 
stimuli. Our sample sizes were, therefore, chosen on the basis that they would be 
sufficient to reveal effects in false recognition. Nevertheless, we also report the 
correct recognition scores and, where appropriate, Bayesian analyses of 
nonsignificant results. In the experiments reported below, participants were presented 
with past or future scenarios and instructed to rate the likelihood of encountering a 
series of objects within those scenarios. Participants in a control condition were 
instructed to visualize typical scenarios with no reference to temporal direction. In 
each experiment, half the studied items were related to the scenario and half were 
unrelated. In order to investigate the effects of future thinking on false recognition, 
some of the more typical items were omitted from the rating tasks and presented as 
lures in the recognition test.  
Experiment 1 
In order to determine the required sample size to produce an effect of rating 
condition on false recognition, we conducted a power analysis of the false recall data 
in the past (planning) and future (planning) conditions reported by Dewhurst et al. 
(2016; Experiment 1). This showed that a minimum sample size of 20 per condition 
would be sufficient to achieve adequate power (1 – 0.8) to replicate the large effect 
size (d = 1.09) we observed. Comparison with our previous study is problematic, 
however, for a couple of reasons. First, Dewhurst et al. presented participants with 
tests of free recall rather than recognition. Second, our previous study used DRM 
lists, which typically produce higher levels of false memory than schema-related lists 
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(see, for example, Dewhurst, Bould, Knott, & Thorley, 2009). On the other hand, the 
current experiments featured more lure items than our previous studies (18 related 
lures in Experiment 1 and 15 in Experiment 2, compared to six DRM critical lures in 
Dewhurst et al., Experiment 1). It was decided, therefore, that a sample size of 30 
participants per condition should have more than adequate power to detect the large 
effect observed in our previous research.  
Method 
Participants. Participants were 90 undergraduate students (69 females) in the 
age range 18-36 (M = 20.49, SD = 3.08). All were native English speakers. 
Participants were tested at individual workstations in groups of up to 5 and received 
course credit for their participation. There were 30 participants in each of the three 
rating conditions. All experiments reported in this manuscript were approved by the 
Ethics Committee of the Psychology Subject Group, School of Life Sciences, 
University of Hull.  
Stimuli and design. An important decision in the current study was whether 
to use a within- or between-subjects manipulation of rating condition. Whereas a 
within-subjects design offers greater power, it comes with the risk of carry-over 
effects between orienting tasks. This was pertinent for both Experiments 1 and 2, in 
which participants were presented with three different scenarios. It was decided that 
manipulating both rating condition and scenario in a fully within-subjects design 
would be unwieldly and likely to produce carry-over effects. For these reasons, 
participants were presented with all three scenarios in the same rating condition (past, 
future, or control) with rating condition manipulated between-subjects.  
The three scenarios used in Experiment 1 were a holiday, a picnic, and a 
camping trip. For each scenario, participants were presented with 24 object nouns, of 
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which 12 were related to the scenario and 12 were unrelated. The nouns were chosen 
following a normative study in which six participants provided ratings for the 
likelihood of encountering the items in the given scenarios. The mean ratings (out of 
5) were 4.12 for the related items and 1.32 for the unrelated items. For the holiday 
scenario, related items included sunblock, currency, and air tickets, and unrelated 
items included hammer, piano, and telescope. Participants were randomly allocated to 
past, future, or visualization conditions and instructed to remember (or imagine) all 
three scenarios. The recognition test contained 72 items. For each scenario, there were 
12 items that had been presented at study. Of these, 6 were related to the scenario and 
6 were unrelated. There were also 12 new items per scenario, of which 6 were closely 
related to the scenario and 6 were unrelated. There were two versions of each study 
condition allowing old and new items to be counterbalanced. The order in which the 
three scenarios were presented was rotated through participants. The full set of stimuli 
and rating instructions are available from the first author. Stimuli presentation and 
data collection were controlled using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software 
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
Procedure. Participants were told that they would be asked to generate 
familiar scenarios and rate the likelihood of encountering a series of objects within 
those scenarios. An incidental learning procedure was used whereby no mention was 
made of the forthcoming memory test. Participants were told that the purpose of the 
study was to investigate the processes involved in thinking about familiar events. The 
rating instructions were adapted from those used by Klein et al. (2010). For 
illustration, the past, future, and visualization instructions for the holiday scenario are 
shown below.  
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Past condition. Think back and remember a time in your past when you went 
on a beach holiday abroad. Try to remember specific details of this holiday, such as 
the things you did, the people you were with, the sights and sounds you experienced, 
and so on. Please spend a few moments remembering this holiday. While you are 
remembering this holiday I am going to present you with a list of words describing 
physical objects. I would like you to rate how likely it was that you took each of the 
objects on the list on the holiday you remember. For some objects, it may be likely 
that you brought them on your holiday. For others, it may be unlikely. It is up to you 
to decide. 
Future condition. Think ahead and imagine a time in your future when you 
will go on a beach holiday abroad. Try to imagine specific details of this holiday, 
such as the things you will do, the people you will be with, the sights and sounds you 
will experience, and so on. Please spend a few moments imagining this holiday. While 
you are imagining this holiday I am going to present you with a list of words 
describing physical objects. I would like you to rate how likely it is that you would 
take each of the objects on the list as you plan your beach holiday abroad. For some 
objects, it may be very likely that you take them on the holiday. For others, it may be 
unlikely. It is up to you to decide. 
Visualization condition. Use your imagination to form a picture of a beach 
holiday. What items appear in the image that you have created of the holiday? While 
you are imagining this holiday I am going to present you with a list of words 
describing physical objects. I would like you to rate how likely it is that each of the 
objects on the list is at the holiday that you have imagined. For some objects, it may 
be likely that they appear in your image. For others, it may be unlikely. It is up to you 
to decide. 
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Participants were allowed 30 seconds to remember or imagine an event. The 
object nouns then appeared one at a time on the screen and participants rated the 
likelihood of encountering (or having encountered) each object on a 5 point Likert 
scale from 1 = Very unlikely to 5 = Very likely. Each word remained on the screen 
for 5 seconds regardless of how quickly participants responded. After completing the 
rating task for all three scenarios, participants were engaged in a nonverbal filler task 
for 10 minutes. They were then given a surprise recognition test that included studied 
and unstudied items from each scenario, presented in a different random order for 
each participant. The recognition test was self-paced.  
Results and Discussion 
Alpha was set at .05 for all main effects and interactions, and all pairwise 
comparisons were Bonferroni-adjusted. Data from the three scenarios were collapsed 
into a single score. Mean numbers of related and unrelated items correctly and falsely 
recognised are displayed in Table 1. Correct and false recognition scores were 
analysed in separate 3 (rating condition: past vs. future vs. visualization) x 2 (item 
type: related versus unrelated) mixed ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second 
factor. The analysis of false recognition showed a significant main effect of rating 
condition, F (2,87) = 4.32, MSE = 2.38, p = .016, ηp2 = .09. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that false recognition was significantly higher in the future condition relative 
to both the past condition, p = .045, and the visualization condition, p = .033. The past 
and visualization conditions did not differ significantly from each other, p = 1.00. 
There was also a significant main effect of item type whereby related lures were more 
likely to be falsely recognised than unrelated lures, F (1,87) = 59.23, MSE = 1.32, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .41.  
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These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F (2,87) = 8.17, 
MSE = 1.32, p = .001, ηp2 = .16. Pairwise comparisons showed that, for related lures, 
future thinking led to reliably higher levels of false recognition than the past, p = .008, 
and visualization, p = .010, conditions, which did not differ significantly from each 
other, p = 1.00. There were no significant differences between the rating conditions in 
the numbers of unrelated lures falsely recognised, all ps = 1.00.  Study ratings were 
analysed in a one-way (rating condition) between-groups ANOVA. The effect of 
rating condition was not significant, F < 1.  
Analysis of correct recognition showed a significant main effect of item type, 
whereby correct recognition scores were higher for related than for unrelated items, F 
(1,87) = 12.18, MSE = 2.70, p = .001, ηp2 = .12. Neither the main effect of rating 
condition nor the interaction were significant, both Fs < 1. In order to conduct a 
Bayesian analysis, the correct recognition scores from the past and future conditions 
were converted into proportions and compared to the expected value derived from the 
correct recall data from Klein et al. (2010), also converted into proportions. The 
analysis found B = 0.22. This provides strong evidence for the null hypothesis that 
rating items in relation to a future event does not enhance correct recognition.  
The main finding of Experiment 1 is that rating items in relation to a simulated 
future event led to higher levels of false recognition than rating them in relation to a 
remembered past event. This pattern is consistent with the findings of Dewhurst et al. 
(2016) and shows that the effect of future thinking on false memory extends beyond 
DRM lists. The significant interaction between rating condition and item type showed 
that the effect was present for related lures but not for unrelated lures. Also consistent 
with the findings of Dewhurst et al., the manipulation of rating condition had no 
reliable effect on correct recognition. This is at odds with the findings of Klein et al. 
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(2010) who found that rating nouns in relation to a future camping trip led to higher 
levels of correct recall than rating them in relation to a past camping trip.  
The findings of Experiment 1 support our previous findings that simulating 
future events enhances the semantic activation processes that give rise to false 
memories (Dewhurst et al., 2016). An alternative explanation, however, is that that 
the effects of future thinking on false memory reflect the fact that past events have 
already happened in a particular way, whereas future events could be simulated as 
happening in numerous ways. This corresponds to the distinction made by Klein et al. 
(2002) between lived time and known time. The difference between the past and future 
conditions may, therefore, reflect the difference between real versus simulated events, 
rather than past versus future events. We believe this is unlikely given that future 
thinking led to higher levels of false recognition than the visualization condition, in 
which participants were instructed to imagine a typical scenario. It is also notable that 
Klein et al (2010) found that future thinking led to higher levels of correct recall than 
imagining an atemporal scenario. However, it is important to address the potential 
confound between temporal direction and the real versus simulated nature of the 
events.  
The confound between temporal direction of type of event was previously 
discussed by Schacter et al. (2012). As they noted, some studies have provided 
evidence for a dissociation between imagining a future event and imagining an 
atemporal scenario. For example, de Vito, Gamboz, Brandimonte, Barone, Amboni, 
and Della Sala (2012) found that patients with Parkinson’s disease showed 
impairments in imagining future events but not in imagining atemporal events. 
However, as Schacter et al. also observed, other studies have shown considerable 
overlap between imagined future events and imagined atemporal events. For example, 
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de Vito, Gamboz, and Brandimonte (2012) found that future and atemporal 
simulations were associated with similar phenomenological details. Comparisons 
have also been made between imagining future events and imagining past events. In 
an fMRI study, Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, (2009) instructed participants to 
imagine events featuring three event details (person, location, and object). The critical 
manipulation was whether participants remembered past events, imagined plausible 
future events, imagined plausible past events, or performed a visualization task. Addis 
found that imagined events were associated with the same patterns of brain activity 
irrespective of whether they were imagined as occurring in the past or in the future. 
These inconsistent findings indicate that the confound between imagining future 
events and imagining hypothetical events has not been fully resolved. We cannot, 
therefore, rule out the possibility that the difference between the past and future 
conditions of Experiment 1 simply reflects the difference between real versus 
simulated events.  
Another possible explanation for the higher levels of false recognition in the 
future rating condition is that participants in the past condition may have used a 
“recall-to reject” strategy (see Clark & Gronlund. 1992, for a review) whereby they 
were able to reject lure items on the grounds that they did not feature in the event they 
recalled during the study phase. This strategy would not have been available to 
participants in the future or visualization conditions.  
We addressed both of these issues in Experiment 2 by asking participants in 
the all three rating conditions to simulate hypothetical events. Briefly, participants 
were instructed to simulate a series of unfamiliar scenarios (e.g., taking part in a bank 
robbery) and the critical manipulation was whether they simulated an event occurring 
in the future, an event occurring in the past, or a typical (atemporal) event. If the 
False memories and planning 
	 17	
findings of Experiment 1 reflect the difference between real and simulated events, 
then we would expect to find no difference between past and future simulated events. 
If, however, the findings of Experiment 1 are due to the future-oriented nature of the 
simulated events, then we should find the same enhancement of false memories in the 
future condition of Experiment 2.   
The use of unfamiliar scenarios in Experiment 2 also allowed us to investigate 
the role of semantic memory in the generation of future events. As noted by Szpunar 
et al. (2014), both episodic and semantic information can be utilised in the generation 
of future events (see Anderson, 2012, and Cordonnier et al., 2016, for examples). In 
Experiment 2, participants were unlikely to have episodic memories for the events 
they were instructed to generate. If false recognition is enhanced in the future 
condition, this would indicate that the pattern observed in Experiment 1 and our 
previous research (Dewhurst et al., 2016) can be driven by semantic knowledge.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. A new group of 90 undergraduates (70 females) in the age range 
18-44 (M=20.41, SD=3.97) took part in Experiment 2. All were native English 
speakers. They were tested at individual workstations in groups of up to 5 and 
received course credit or payment of £5 for their participation.  
Stimuli and design. The three scenarios used in Experiment 2 were a bank 
robbery, going into space, and making a movie. For each scenario, participants were 
presented with 20 items, of which 10 were related to the scenario and 10 were 
unrelated. Six participants provided normative ratings for the likelihood of 
encountering the items in the given scenarios. The mean ratings (out of 5) were 4.23 
for the related items and 1.40 for the unrelated items). For the bank robbery scenario, 
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related items included guard, account, and weapon, and unrelated items included 
doctor, towel, and guitar. Old and new items were counterbalanced, and the order in 
which the scenarios were presented was rotated through participants. The recognition 
test contained 60 items. For each scenario, there were 10 studied items (5 related and 
5 unrelated) and 10 lures (5 related and 5 unrelated). Stimuli and rating instructions 
are available from the first author. Stimuli presentation and data collection were 
controlled using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). 
Procedure. Participants were randomly allocated to past, future and 
visualization conditions and instructed to imagine the three scenarios in sequence. As 
in Experiment 1, an incidental learning procedure was employed. Past, future, and 
visualization rating instructions for the bank robbery scenario are shown below.  
Past condition. In this task, we would like you to imagine that you have just 
led the robbery of a well-guarded bank. Over the past few months, you managed to 
find people to help you, made a plan, and gathered the supplies you needed. We are 
going to show you a list of words, and we would like you to rate how relevant each of 
these items was for you in this situation. Some of the words may be relevant and 
others may not – it’s up to you to decide.  
Future condition. In this task, we would like you to imagine that you are 
planning the robbery of a well-guarded bank. Over the next few months, you’ll need 
to find people to help you, make a plan, and gather any supplies you might need. We 
are going to show you a list of words, and we would like you to rate how relevant 
each of these items would be for you in this situation. Some of the words may be 
relevant and others may not – it’s up to you to decide.  
Visualization condition. Use your imagination to form a picture of a bank 
robbery. What items appear in the image that you have created of the bank robbery? 
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While you are imagining this bank robbery I am going to present you with a list of 
words. I would like you to rate how relevant each of these items would be at the bank 
robbery that you have imagined. For some objects, it may be likely that they appear in 
your image. For others, it may be unlikely. It is up to you to decide. 
 After completing all three rating tasks, participants were engaged in a 
nonverbal filler task for 10 minutes and then given the surprise recognition test. The 
recognition test was self-paced and the items were presented in a different random 
order for each participant.  
Results and Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, the data from the three scenarios were collapsed into a 
single score. Table 2 shows the mean numbers of related and unrelated items correctly 
and falsely recognised as a function of rating condition and item type. Hits and false 
alarms were analysed in separate 3 (rating condition: past vs. future vs. visualization) 
x 2 (item type: related vs. unrelated) ANOVA with repeated measures on the second 
factor. The analysis of false recognition showed a significant main effect of rating 
condition, F (2,87) = 7.81, MSE = 2.63, p = .001, ηp2 = .15. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that false recognition rates were higher in the future condition relative to the 
past and visualization conditions, p = .021 and p = .001, respectively. The past and 
visualization conditions did not differ significantly from each other, p = .86.  
There was also a significant main effect of item type, whereby related lures 
were more likely to be falsely recognised than unrelated lures, F (1,87) = 30.19 MSE 
= 1.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .26. The interaction between rating condition and item type 
was also significant, F (2,87) = 4.35, MSE = 1.46, p = .016, ηp2 = .09. Pairwise 
comparisons across rating conditions showed that false recognition rates for related 
lures were higher in the future condition than in the past and visualization conditions, 
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p = .015 and p = .001, respectively. No significant differences were observed in the 
unrelated lures. Pairwise comparisons across item type showed that participants in the 
future condition falsely recognised more related than unrelated lures, p < .001. The 
same pattern was observed in the past condition, p = .027, but was not reliably present 
in the visualization condition, p = .091.  
In the analysis of correct recognition, neither the main effect of rating 
condition nor the main effect of item type were significant, both Fs < 1. The 
interaction between rating condition and item type also failed to reach significance, F 
(2,87) = 1.72, MSE = 1.66, p = .19, ηp2 = .04. A Bayesian analysis comparing 
proportions of words correctly recognised in the past and future conditions, again 
using the correct recall from Klein et al. (2010) for the predicted effect size, found B 
= 0.23. This provides further evidence for the null hypothesis that rating items in 
relation to a future event does not enhance correct recognition. Study ratings were 
analysed in a one-way (rating condition) between-groups ANOVA. The effect of 
rating condition was not significant, F < 1. 
The findings of Experiment 2 are consistent with those of Experiment 1. 
Rating nouns in relation to a future event led to higher levels of false recognition than 
rating them in relation to a past event or visualizing a typical scenario. Experiment 2 
also confirmed that this effect does not simply reflect the hypothetical nature of future 
events. Participants in both the past and future conditions were instructed to simulate 
hypothetical events, but rating the nouns in relation to a simulated future event led to 
higher levels of false recognition than rating them in relation to a simulated past 
event. These findings indicate that the findings of Experiment 1 (and those of 
Dewhurst et al., 2016) do not simply reflect the difference between a real event that 
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happened in a particular way and a hypothetical event that could unfold in numerous 
ways.  
The findings of Experiment 2 also indicate that the effect of future thinking on 
false memory does not depend on the activation of episodic memories, but can also 
occur when participants simulate events by drawing on semantic knowledge (see 
Anderson, 2012, and Cordonnier et al., 2016, for discussion of the role of semantic 
memory in the generation of future events). The hypothetical nature of the events in 
Experiment 2 also rules out the possibility that participants in the past condition used 
a “recall-to-reject” strategy whereby they rejected lures because they did not feature 
in the event they remembered in the study phase. The findings are more consistent 
with the view that simulating a future event enhances the activation of related 
concepts that enables one to think beyond the information presented.  
One possible interpretation of the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 (and those 
of Dewhurst et al., 2016) is that simulating a future event activates a “planning mode” 
that directs attention to items one might need in the future. When planning an activity, 
such as a holiday, one typically generates a mental checklist of items that might be 
needed. The activation of related knowledge in such situations would be adaptive if it 
guided attention towards items that might otherwise be forgotten. We investigated this 
possibility in Experiment 3 by replacing the memory test with a task in which 
participants were instructed to generate items that one would typically require in a 
given scenario. Participants took part in the past, future, or visualization conditions of 
the holiday scenario used in Experiment 1 and were instructed to rate the objects 
nouns for how likely they were to be encountered. Immediately after the rating task, 
participants were asked to generate as many items as they could think of that someone 
might take on a holiday.  
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Experiment 3 
Method 
Participants. A new group of 90 undergraduates (58 females) in the age range 
18-44 (M=21.79, SD=4.47) took part in Experiment 3. All were native English 
speakers. They were tested at individual workstations in groups of up to 5 and 
received a payment of £5 for their participation.  
Stimuli and design. The rating instructions and object nouns from the holiday 
scenario used in Experiment 1 were employed again. Rating condition (past, future, or 
visualization) was manipulated between participants. Stimuli presentation and data 
collection were controlled using E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA). The dependent variables were the numbers of studied words and new 
words generated in the listing task.  
Procedure. Participants were instructed to remember a past holiday, imagine 
planning a future holiday, or imagine a typical holiday, and then to rate the nouns in 
relation to the target scenario. Immediately after the rating task, participants received 
the following instructions: 
Please list as many items as you can think of that someone might take on 
holiday. These can be items from the list you just rated or new items not on the list. 
Please list as many as you can.  
Participants were allowed 10 minutes to complete the listing task.  
Results and Discussion 
 All items listed by at least one participant were compiled into a single 
document and rated by two independent raters according to the following instructions:  
Please rate the likelihood that the following items would be taken on a 
holiday. It could be any kind of holiday. Please do not rate the likelihood that YOU 
False memories and planning 
	 23	
would take them on a holiday, but that someone could in principle take them on a 
holiday. Please rate them on a 5-point scale from 1 = very unlikely, to 5 = very likely.  
Inter-rater reliability was good (Cohen’s Kappa = .72). For each listed item, 
the mean of the two ratings was calculated, ensuring that synonyms (e.g., travel guide 
and guidebook) received the same ratings. As expected, given that participants had 
been instructed to generate items that someone might take on a holiday, ratings made 
by the two independent raters were high (see Table 3). These ratings were used to 
calculate the mean ratings for each participant, which were then analysed in a 3 
(rating condition: past vs. future vs. visualization) x 2 (Status: old vs. new) ANOVA 
with repeated measures on the second factor. A significant main effect of status 
showed that likelihood ratings were higher for studied items than for unstudied items, 
F (1,87) = 227.69, MSE = .07, p < .001, ηp2 = .72. Neither the main effect of rating 
condition nor the interaction were significant, both F < 1. The finding that likelihood 
ratings were lower for unstudied than for studied items is likely a reflection of the fact 
that the study lists contained the majority of the items previously rated as being 
associated with a holiday (see stimuli and design section of Experiment 1).  
The numbers of items generated by participants in the listing task were then 
analysed. Table 4 shows the mean numbers of studied and unstudied items generated 
as a function of rating condition. Ten items rated by both raters as “very unlikely” 
were omitted from these analyses. The first analysis was a one-way (rating condition: 
past vs. future vs. visualization) between-groups ANOVA on the total number of 
items generated in the listing task. A significant main effect of rating condition was 
observed, F (2,87) = 9.82, MSE = 45.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .18. Pairwise comparisons 
showed that participants in the visualization condition listed fewer items than those in 
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the past and future rating conditions, p = .020 and p < .001, respectively. The past and 
future conditions did not differ significantly from each other, p = .34.  
This was followed by separate analyses of studied and unstudied items. A 
significant main effect of rating condition was observed in studied items, F (2,87) = 
10.05, MSE = 4.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .19. Pairwise comparisons showed that participants 
in the past condition generated more studied items than participants in the future, p = 
.012, and visualization, p < .001, conditions, which did not differ significantly from 
each other, p = .46. There was also a significant main effect of rating condition in the 
number of unstudied items generated, F (2,87) = 8.66, MSE = 41.84, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.17. Pairwise comparisons showed that participants in the future rating condition 
generated more unstudied items than those in the past, p = .032, and visualization, p < 
.001, conditions, which did not differ significantly from each other, p = .41. Study 
ratings (i.e., the ratings made by participants when studying the items) were analysed 
in a one-way between-groups ANOVA. The effect of rating condition was not 
significant, F < 1. 
Comparison of the past and future conditions indicates that participants in the 
future rating condition generated fewer studied items and more unstudied items than 
participants in the past rating condition. In order to confirm this, we conducted a 2 
(temporal direction: past vs. future) x 2 (status of generated item: studied vs. 
unstudied) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. This showed 
a nonsignificant main effect of temporal direction, F (1,58) = 2.08, MSE = 28.29, p = 
.16, ηp2 = .04, but a significant main effect of status, whereby participants generated 
more unstudied than studied items, F (1,58) = 74.91, MSE = 24.99, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.56. These effects were qualified by a significant interaction, F (2,87) = 10.56, MSE = 
24.99, p = .002, ηp2 = .15. Pairwise comparisons confirmed that participants in the 
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future rating condition listed more unstudied items, p = .019, and fewer studied items, 
p = .006, than participants in the past rating condition.  
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that future thinking enhances the semantic 
activation processes that give rise to schema-based false memories. The findings of 
Experiment 3 suggest a potential adaptive role for this effect by showing that future 
thinking facilitates the generation of items that might be needed in a hypothetical 
scenario. It is also notable that the novel items listed in the future condition were no 
less likely to be taken on holiday than those listed in the past and visualization 
conditions, as judged by the independent raters. While participants in the future 
condition generated more unstudied items in the listing task, there was no loss in the 
plausibility of the items generated. The finding that future thinking enhanced the 
generation of novel items, but not studied items, suggests the activation of a planning 
mode that goes beyond the information presented and directs attention to items that 
one might otherwise forget. The current findings thus suggest close links between the 
simulation and planning modes of prospection proposed by Szpunar et al. (2014) by 
showing that simulation of a future event facilitates the subsequent planning of the 
event.  
One unanticipated finding from Experiment 3 was that participants in the 
future condition generated fewer studied items than participants in the past condition. 
This contrasts with the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 and our previous research 
(Dewhurst et al., 2016) in which levels of correct recall and recognition of studied 
items were not affected by rating condition. We suspect this discrepancy is due to the 
use of a listing task in Experiment 3, which did not explicitly instruct participants to 
recall the items they rated at study. In this sense, the listing task could be seen as an 
implicit test of memory (see Roediger & McDermott, 1993, for a review). In contrast, 
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participants in our previous studies were explicitly instructed to retrieve items from 
the study phase. This raises the intriguing possibility that the effects of future thinking 
on correct and false memory will depend on how memory is tested. An interesting 
direction for future research would be to investigate the effects of future thinking on a 
wider range of memory measures, including both explicit and implicit measures.  
General Discussion 
 The current study investigated the relationship between future thinking and 
false memory. In Experiment 1, rating common objects for their relevance to an 
imagined future event increased the false recognition of related objects, relative to 
conditions in which the objects were rated for relevance to a past event or an 
atemporal visualization of an event. Experiment 2 extended this effect to events that 
participants were unlikely to have experienced personally, thereby showing that the 
effect of future thinking is not simply the result of thinking about a hypothetical event 
as opposed to a real event. The current findings are consistent with those of Dewhurst 
et al. (2016) and extend them by showing that the effects of future thinking on false 
memory are not confined to the use of associative (DRM) lists designed to produce 
high levels of false memory. Future thinking can also increase false memories via the 
activation of semantic knowledge in the form of schemas.   
In terms of the taxonomy of prospection proposed by Szpunar et al. (2014), 
the current findings show that false memories are increased by the simulation of 
future events, irrespective of whether the simulation draws on episodic memory or 
semantic knowledge. The findings of Experiment 2, in particular, suggest that this 
effect is driven by the future orientation of the simulation task rather than the type of 
knowledge on which the simulation is based. Even when participants are instructed to 
simulate events for which they are unlikely to have episodic memories, simulating a 
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future event still leads to higher levels of false recognition than simulating a past 
event. According to D’Argembeau et al. (2010), imagining a future event leads to 
more flexible thinking than remembering a past event. The findings from Experiment 
2 suggest that this greater flexibility is not simply due to differences in the types of 
knowledge from which past and future events are drawn. It is the future-oriented 
nature of the simulated event that is crucial. 
The increase in false memories when imagining the future is also consistent 
with the recent finding by Campbell et al. (2017) that related concepts are 
automatically activated when simulating a future event. Whereas successful 
remembering often requires the inhibition of related concepts in tasks such as 
retrieval-induced forgetting (Anderson et al., 1994), Campbell et al. found no 
evidence of inhibition of related concepts when imagining future events. On the 
contrary, they found that related concepts were primed when participants were 
instructed to imagine a future event. Extending this to the current study, it is possible 
that related concepts were inhibited when participants retrieved details of a past event, 
but primed when participants imagined a future event. When these related concepts 
matched the lures in the recognition test, false recognition was more likely to occur 
when those concepts were primed rather than inhibited at study. This interpretation is 
consistent with findings that false memories are reduced by tasks that require the 
inhibition of studied items, such as retrieval-induced forgetting (starns & Hicks, 
2004). 
Experiment 3 revealed a potential adaptive role for the associative processes 
that give rise to false memories by demonstrating their role in generating items that one 
might require when planning an event. However, a caveat to this is that participants in 
the future condition generated fewer studied items than those in the past condition. A 
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stronger case could be made for an adaptive function if future thinking increased the 
generation of both studied and unstudied items. It is possible that some participants in 
the past condition interpreted the listing task as a memory test and prioritised the 
retrieval of studied items (analogous to problem of “retrieval intentionality” that can 
contaminate tests of implicit memory; see Schacter, Bowers, & Booker, 1989). If so, 
the number of studied items listed in the past condition could have been inflated, giving 
the impression that the future condition was less effective in terms of generating studied 
items. This could be prevented in future studies by asking participants to indicate 
whether they intentionally retrieved studied items during the listing task and replacing 
those who respond in the affirmative. In the meantime, however, we can conclude that 
future thinking facilitates the generation of items that one has not recently thought 
about. 
The current findings provide further support for the emerging view that false 
memories can be adaptive in the sense of having positive consequences for behaviour. 
Previous research has shown that false memories can be associated with successful 
problem solving. For example, Arkes and Harkness (1980) found that students who 
successfully diagnosed a medical condition from a list of symptoms were more likely 
to falsely recognise nonstudied symptoms associated with the condition than students 
who failed to make the diagnosis. More recently, Howe, Garner, Dewhurst, and Ball 
(2010) found that participants were more likely to solve remote associate problems 
when the solution was a falsely recalled critical lure from a DRM list (see also Howe, 
Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011, Howe, Garner, & Patel, 2013, and Howe, 
Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball, 2013). Planning a future activity can also be 
seen as a problem solving activity. The current findings, together with those discussed 
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above, show that false memories of goal-related information can facilitate planning 
and problem solving activities.  
It could be argued that the difference between the past and future conditions in 
Experiment 2 is at odds with the findings of Addis et al. (2009) that imagining past 
and future events led to the same patterns of brain activity. However, the main aim of 
Addis et al. was to address the confound between past versus future events and real 
versus imagined events. Their findings demonstrated that the same brain areas are 
recruited when imagining hypothetical past and future events. The findings from the 
current study are not incompatible with this view. They simply show that the 
associative processes activated when imagining hypothetical events are enhanced 
when the events are imagined as occurring in the future rather than the past. The 
findings of Experiment 3 suggest one possible reason for this difference. We have 
discussed the possibility of a planning mode than directs attention to items one might 
need when planning an activity. Whereas activating a planning mode is likely to serve 
a functional role when imagining a future event, it is less likely to be useful when 
imagining a past event.  
The effects of Experiment 2 might also seem at odds with the finding by Klein 
et al. (2002) that the mnemonic effect of planning is greater when planning tasks 
invoke lived time, based on episodic memories, rather than known time, based on 
semantic memories. The rating tasks in Experiment 2 are unlikely to have invoked 
lived time – in fact, they were chosen on the basis that participants were unlikely to 
have relevant personal experience – yet participants in the future rating condition still 
showed higher levels of false recognition than participants in the past and 
visualization conditions. However, Klein et al. did not claim that the effects of 
planning on recall is confined only to tasks than invoke lived time, merely that such 
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tasks produce a greater memory enhancement than events that invoke known time. 
We have not yet compared the effects of lived versus known time on false memory. 
Comparison of the data from Experiments 1 and 2 would be misleading as they 
involved different tasks and different study lists. Nevertheless, a more direct 
comparison of the effects of lived versus known time might reveal more about the 
respective roles of episodic and semantic memories in producing false memories.  
In contrast to the effects observed in false recognition, the manipulation of 
rating condition did not significantly affect correct recognition in either Experiment 1 
or Experiment 2. These null effects are consistent with the findings of our previous 
study (Dewhurst et al., 2016) but at odds with the findings of Klein et al. (2010). The 
Bayesian analyses of both the current data and our previous data support the null 
hypothesis that future thinking does not affect correct recall or recognition, so how 
can these inconsistencies be explained? The most salient difference between our 
experiments and those of Klein et al. is that we used study lists that were designed to 
produce high numbers of false memories. In contrast, the lists used by Klein et al. 
were not constructed for this purpose. Although Klein et al. did not report intrusion 
rates, the follow-up study by Klein et al. (2011) reported only five extra-list intrusion 
errors from 162 participants, with no participant producing more than one, and Klein 
et al. (2012) reported only three intrusions from 120 participants. One possible 
explanation for the discrepant findings is that the omission of related items from the 
study lists (DRM critical lures in our previous research and schema-related lures in 
the current experiments) caused the effects reported by Klein and colleagues in 
correct memory to shift to false memory. It is notable that the overall pattern we 
observed in false recognition matches the pattern observed by Klein et al. in correct 
recall. Specifically, both studies showed significant increases in the future condition 
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but virtually identical performance in the past and visualization conditions (which 
Klein et al. referred to as an atemporal condition). 
This shift from true to false memory could be explained in terms of the 
distinction between relational and item-specific encoding (Hunt & Einstein, 1981). As 
discussed above, imagining the future leads to more flexible thinking than 
remembering the past (D’Argembeau et al., 2010). It is possible, therefore, that 
thinking about future events enhances relational encoding. Relational encoding has 
been shown to enhance correct recall. For example, Guynn, McDaniel, Strosser, 
Ramirez, Castleberry, and Arnett (2014) found that relational encoding enhanced the 
generation component of recall. This can explain the effects of future thinking on 
correct recall reported by Klein et al. (2010). However, both McCabe, Presmanes, 
Robertson, and Smith (2004) and Huff and Bodner (2011) found that relational 
encoding did not enhance correct recall in the DRM paradigm. It did, however, 
increase false recall rates. This raises the possibility that, when study lists are not 
conducive to producing high levels false memory, as in the lists used by Klein et al., 
the effects of relational encoding occur in correct memory. However, when critical 
items are omitted from study lists (as in DRM lists or the schema-related lists used in 
the current experiments), the effects of relational encoding shift from correct to false 
recall. This is highly speculative but suggests one possible direction for future 
research.  
To summarize, the current findings show that imagining future events 
increases the false recognition of items associated with those events. Consistent with 
our previous research (Dewhurst et al., 2016), rating items for their relevance to a 
future event led to higher levels of false recognition than rating their relevance to a 
past event or a visualized scenario. The findings of Experiment 1 showed that our 
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previous findings are not confined to DRM lists designed to produce high levels of 
false memory. The findings of Experiment 2 indicate that the effect of future thinking 
is not simply due to a comparison between a real event that happened in a particular 
way and a hypothetical event that could unfold in numerous ways. The current 
findings are more consistent with the view that the simulation of a future event directs 
attention to items one might need when planning a future activity. The potentially 
adaptive nature of this effect was demonstrated in Experiment 3, in which participants 
who rated items for relevance to a future holiday generated more new items and fewer 
old items when listing objects one might take on a holiday. These findings are 
consistent with the notion of a planning mode that is facilitated by the activation 
processes that give rise to false memories.  
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